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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use a sample of UK entrepreneurial initial public offering (IPO)
companies to investigate whether they change their compensation strategies as they undertake the
crucial transformation of the business from private to public status.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the agency perspective to underpin an examination
of the changes within the compensation packages of companies at the stage of the initial public offering,
particularly with regard to the use of executive director incentive schemes, and compares this to ‘‘best
practice’’ guidelines issued within the UK.
Findings – The paper discovers that even though incentive schemes are adopted, the majority are
unconditional and requiring only an improvement in share price and the executive to remain employed in
order for gains to be made. The general finding is that before IPO most companies did not have an
incentive pay scheme in place, and those that did, operated unconditional option schemes. However,
after IPO most companies introduced an incentive pay scheme, but the majority were unconditional
rather than conditional (i.e. schemes requiring executives to meet pre-determined performance criteria
– as recommended by ‘‘best practice’’ guidelines).
Originality/value – The paper exposes that, contrary to ‘‘best practice’’ guidelines and regulations,
many of these schemes reward executives unconditionally with the only factor being them remaining in
employment over the vesting period. Despite ‘‘best practice’’ and regulations, firms still appear to be
defensive and protect the executives from rigorous scrutiny by shareholders.
Keywords Chief executives, Incentive schemes, Remuneration, Share options, Corporate governance,
United Kingdom
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
An initial public offering (IPO) involves a firm, previously ‘‘private’’ obtaining a stock
exchange listing and issuing its shares to outside shareholders, thereby becoming ‘‘public’’.
Their crucial transformation from private to public status requires companies to take due
note of various corporate governance matters, particularly the Combined Code
requirements and ‘‘best practice’’ recommendations. The flotation of the company often
leads to them being confronted by the ‘‘principal-agent’’ concern: how to reconcile the
interests of incumbent managers and executive directors (as ‘‘agents’’) with those of the
company’s ultimate owners – the shareholders (as ‘‘principals’’) (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). ‘‘Best practice’’ guidelines suggest that appropriate mechanisms need to be put in
place to motivate directors to align their own interests more closely with the shareholders,
thus ensuring goal congruence (ABI, 1994, 1993). Incentive schemes for executive directors
have been recommended as the key way to help overcome agency problems (Beatty and
Zajac, 1994; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Murphy, 1985). In response to this and in
order to recruit and retain competent executives, companies within the UK now design
compensation strategies to incorporate long-term incentives (Conyon, 2000; Conyon et al.,
2000). These compensation strategies involve the use of two main types of incentives,
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namely the executive share option scheme (ESOS) and the long-term incentive plan (LTIP).
To assist companies in devising suitable schemes which align the interests of executives
and shareholders the Greenbury Committee Report (1995) and the Association of British
Insurers have proposed ‘‘best practice’’ guidelines (ABI, 2002, 1994, 1993, 1999, 1995
(Amended June 1999)). These guidelines recommend companies adopt conditional
incentive schemes, which incorporate predetermined performance criteria, which must be
met before option and LTIP grants can vest (see below, section on performance evaluation).
This paper presents an empirical study of the compensation arrangements for a sample of
UK entrepreneurial IPO companies prior to the IPO and after the IPO to identify changes in
their executive incentive scheme arrangements. It uses the principal-agent perspective to
underpin the examination of the changes within the compensation packages of these
companies at the stage of the initial public offering. It shows that, in line with agency
predictions, changes do occur that can be associated with progressive governance and
attempts to begin good practice at the time of going public.
Background
The IPO company provides researchers with a unique opportunity to examine executive
compensation. The founder, who remains in control of the company at the time of IPO must
begin the process of a transfer in managerial direction to a more open, professional
management. This involves the consideration of a variety of issues and in particular
corporate governance. In June 1998, the London Stock Exchange published the Principles
of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (‘‘The Combined Code’’) which embraces
the work of Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) and became effective in
respect of accounting periods on or after 31 December 1998. Thus at the time of the offering
it is vital to show good corporate governance practices. The outcome of this process leads
directly to a dilution of ownership from the founders with a transfer to outside investors. As a
result, agency theory can adequately underpin much of the governance research
completed to date and indeed this research. The uniqueness of the IPO is provided by the
fact that that the public have the first opportunity to examine thoroughly company specific
information and it will be the first of many times that the company announces to future
investors the compensation packages of the executive directors (Certo et al., 2001).
Classic agency theory shows a relationship where the owners (principals) of modern
companies, namely the shareholders, delegate the management of the company to hired
persons (agents) (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These hired persons take the
form of management and in particular the higher echelons of company management, i.e. the
board of directors. The separation of ownership from control leads to a position where there
is imperfect information between the principals and agents. These asymmetries of
information show that the agent has increasing insider knowledge as compared with the
more disadvantaged principal. This leaves room for self-serving opportunist behaviour by
the agent (Berle and Means, 1932). Agency theory then attempts to reconcile this by
encouraging the use of contracts, which encourage the agent to performmore in line with the
wishes of the principal. The costs incurred by these prescriptive contracts are known as
‘‘agency costs’’.
Agency costs are minimised where the principal has complete knowledge over the actions
of the agent, and as such corporate governance by way of monitoring and incentive
alignment is not seen to be an issue here. However, when there is not complete information,
outcome based contracts for the executives are desirable and governance issues such as
monitoring and incentive alignment should be an integral part of such contracts (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). Indeed, ‘‘corporations can and should increase their control over top
managers by increasing the use of managerial incentives and monitoring by the board of
directors’’ (Zajac and Westphal, 1994).
In the case of IPOs, as we show below, the transition from private to public status requires
companies, now that they have widened their shareholder base, to consider either revising
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their existing executive incentive schemes or to introduce such a scheme for the first time in
order to adjust to the new situation confronting them.
The provision of incentive-based compensation
Executive compensation packages have been increasingly used as a strategic tool to
attract, retain and motive key employees in an increasingly global labour market (Conyon,
2000). In the UK the typical executive package as seen within the range of mature publicly
quoted companies, will comprise a base salary and benefits (such as a company car,) an
annual bonus (which is often considered as short-term incentive remuneration) and a
long-term incentive component, typically in the form of share options or long-term incentive
plans (Conyon et al., 2000; Pass, 2003: Pass et al., 2000).
The executives of the IPO company have the challenging task of both making compensation
packages attractive to executives and showing structures are in place to motive these
executives to provide shareholder value. As such incentive schemes and monitoring are
essential and can be seen as a mechanism to alleviate agency problems (Berkema et al.,
1997; Hermlain and Weisbach, 1991; Murphy, 1985). This will aid to promote investor
confidence at the time of the IPO and promote confidence in the company’s future
development and success.
Thus investors in the IPO company, whist investing at a time of uncertainty, are likely to value
this signal as a positive corporate governance strategy that will effectively align the actions
of the executives to those required by the shareholders.
IPO company compensation packages for executive directors tend to mirror those
employed by long-established mature companies. The base salary and benefits can be
deemed as the foundations of the salary package. A short-term, annual bonus provides
some form of performance related risk, but this is only judged on (as a rule) the previous 12
months business figures (within the context of the IPO company, this is often related to, and
paid out upon, the successful flotation of the company. Thus for many IPO executives this
provides a short-term remuneration boost simply from the fact that the company has
floated).
Long-term incentive strategies take two main forms, namely the ESOS and the LTIP. ESOSs
and LTIPs involve the periodic grant/award of a specified number of shares in the company
to the executive, which can be exercised/vested at some future date. Option and LTIP grants
are commonly awarded annually and the maximum number allocated is usually linked to the
value of the executives’ basic salary.
The standard UK executive share option scheme provides the executive with the right (but
not the obligation) to purchase shares at a fixed predetermined price (the ‘‘exercise’’ or
‘‘strike’’ price) following some specified period time (usually after a minimum period of three
years). These schemes have been categorised as to those that have no specific
performance targets attached, referred to from now on as ‘‘unconditional’’ schemes, and
those with specific pre-determined performance target requirements in order for the share
options to vest (‘‘conditional’’ schemes). In the case of unconditional schemes there are no
pre-determined performance requirements built in. The executive ‘‘gains’’ if the market price
of the company’s shares at the time of vesting is greater than the ‘‘exercise’’ price. However,
most modern option schemes are conditional and have pre-determined performance criteria
attached thus preventing the executive from exercising their right to purchase until such
performance criteria are met (the section on ‘‘Performance evaluation’’ below discusses this
issue in detail).
Long-term incentive plans are similar to conditional options schemes in terms of their
general grant procedures, the specification of predetermined performance criteria and
minimum vesting requirement. Unlike option schemes, however, LTIP awards vest at ‘‘zero
price’’ (i.e. at no cost to the executive).
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Scrutiny of the prospectus documents shows that either just prior to the IPO or at the point of
the IPO, remuneration committees are established and are comprised predominately of
non-executive directors. Companies typically take this significant time of the IPO to either
implement an executive incentive scheme for the first time or to adapt existing ones. A priori
it is important that an IPO company should demonstrate that it is prepared to put in place
compensation packages which encourages executives to promote shareholder value in
order to encourage potential investors to subscribe to the flotation of the company.
Data and results
The data sample used in this study comprises a unique data set of UK initial public offering
companies that have entrepreneurial founders on the boards of directors at the time of
flotation. The data in this paper reports the results of a pilot study covering just one year from
a larger sample of UK IPO companies. The listings for the main study and this pilot, have
both been sourced from both the London Stock Exchange New Issues Listing and
information from the Market Information & Analysis section which hold historical fact sheets
for all issues from 1998, (including companies issuing additional shares, re-admissions and
transfers between markets). Lists have been merged and cross-referenced to enable a
unique complete list of all issues and a list of IPO companies to be obtained.
Using IPO companies may have significant advantages in order to test the principal-agent
relationship due to the dilution of ownership at the IPO. Caution must be observed though as
at the time of the IPO, particularly with companies that have strong entrepreneurial
ownership dispersion may be less than other IPO flotations where no founders have
ownership. Indeed Baker and Gompers (2003) warn that at the time of the IPO companies
may be more likely to have optimal governance and incentive structures compared to more
established companies due to this very point.
The companies within the pilot study that provide the data sample have been collected from
those floated on the London Stock Exchange (Main market and the TechMark) and the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) between the period of 1 January 2001 and 31 December
2001. For the given period, the London Stock Exchange lists show us that 150 companies
were floated as initial public offerings. The IPO prospectuses for all 150 companies were
obtained. These were predominately sourced via subscription to Thomson Research, which
provides a comprehensive coverage of company filings for publicly quoted UK companies.
Missing prospectuses were obtained either via company web sites, or by telephone/written
request to the companies or their advisors whichever was deemed more appropriate. The
Application for Listing or prospectus was examined with particular emphasis given to the
section detailing the history and founders of the company. Any companies that were unit or
investment trust were excluded from the sample first, then those deemed to involve a
de-merger, merger or acquisition, corporate spin off, equity carve outs, reorganisations, or
could be considered as solely acquisition vehicles were also excluded. This resulted in 63
companies who clearly demonstrated that they had been developed via the entrepreneurial
process with entrepreneurial founders and those founders were serving as directors at the
time of the flotation. The transition from entrepreneur founder/owner of the company to a
more dispersed ownership structure gives clear grounds for change in corporate
governance, and it is these changes that result in agency problems arising that can then
be further examined. The IPO company provides an ideal setting to further examine the
impact of this change on incentive pay strategies.
The data reported below have been complied from the information contained in the
prospectuses of the 63 companies and published in pursuance of their IPO in 2001.
Typically, an IPO prospectus provided details of relevant company information (trading
history, financial record, executive directors etc.) including also details of compensation
packages for directors. Examination of the 63 company prospectuses indicated that 33
companies at IPO either continued or adopted an ‘‘unconditional’’ incentive pay scheme
and 26 companies either continued or adopted a ‘‘conditional’’ scheme at IPO. Of those 26
companies operating a conditional scheme 17 companies disclosed details of the
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performance criteria of their schemes but nine companies did not (see performance
measures table below and the Appendix). The lack of transparency in the latter case was, as
we argue below, a matter of concern. In 2002, The Directors Remuneration Regulation was
passed by the Government, which requires companies to disclose details of their incentive
schemes (The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002). However, as yet
none of the nine companies have conformed, but in most cases their latest (2003) Annual
Reports indicate that they will do so in the near future. Also some companies currently
operating ‘‘unconditional’’ schemes have indicated that they will consider making their
schemes ‘‘conditional’’. The general consensus is that it is ‘‘early days’’ and that the
appropriate time for review/change of existing incentive arrangements is after the
completion of the first post-IPO vesting cycle (for these nine companies this is three years),
i.e. in 2004.
From the initial investigations of the 63 companies, 58 (92 per cent) had established
remuneration committees. There were no remuneration committees that were comprised
solely of executive directors but by contrast 39 of the 58 remuneration committees
comprised solely non executive directors, 15 remuneration committees comprised of both
executive and non executive directors and 4 merely stated the presence of a remuneration
committee but gave no further details as to which members of the board sat on the
committee.
The establishment of remuneration committees holds no surprises and indeed this means
that for the most part they comply with the recommendations of Greenbury (1995) and
Hampel (1998a, b).
1. Pre IPO incentive pay schemes
Table I shows the overall situation with regards to incentive pay for the sample firms prior to
the IPO. Pre IPO, 22 (35 per cent) of the 63 companies had incentive pay schemes in place
that provided long-term rewards. Table II indicates that of the 22 companies with incentive
pay pre IPO only three had conditional schemes operating, whilst the vast majority (86 per
cent) of the schemes operated were unconditional.
The high overall incidence of ‘‘no’’ incentive pay scheme and the preponderance of
unconditional incentive schemes pre IPO is in accordance with agency theory. In these
cases the principal-agent ‘‘problem’’ is either non-existent or minimal since the founding
entrepreneur is the owner of the company and also the main executive director, i.e. there is
no fundamental separation of ownership and control.
However, as agency theory predicts, the dilution of ownership and control which occurs
when a business changes from ‘‘private’’ to ‘‘public’’ and takes on a wider ‘‘outside’’
shareholder base necessitates the company to consider the relationship between
Table I Presence of incentive pay pre IPO
Description Number
Companies with incentive pay pre IPO 22
Companies without incentive pay pre IPO 41
Total companies 63
Table II Pre IPO incentive schemes
Description Number
Companies with conditional incentive pay schemes 3
Companies with unconditional incentive pay schemes 19
Total companies with incentive schemes pre IPO 22
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incumbent executives and their ‘‘new’’ shareholders. It is at this point (i.e. at IPO) that it is
reasonable to expect that companies may take the opportunity of the IPO to review their
incentive pay strategy and begin to progress towards structures in line with those
recommended by ‘‘best practice’’.
Following these changes nine companies in total operated conditional schemes (two of the
three companies already having a conditional schemes plus seven companies newly
adopting a conditional scheme) while 12 companies continued to operate unconditional
schemes. Table III shows of the 22 companies with incentive pay pre IPO (all being
executive share option schemes – ESOS), 15 companies replaced their original scheme
with a new ESOS, while six companies continued to operate their existing schemes.
2. Incentive pay schemes introduced at IPO for the first time
In addition to the companies noted in section 1, a further 38 out of the 41 companies without
incentive pay schemes pre IPO introduced such schemes at the time of (or immediately prior
to) going public. Of those implementing their initial incentive pay scheme, 37 companies
chose to introduce executive share option schemes only, whilst one company implemented
an ESOS and LTIP scheme. Only three companies chose not to introduce an incentive pay
scheme.
As can be seen from Table IV, a small majority of companies chose to introduce an
unconditional scheme rather than a conditional one.
Combining the data contained in Tables III and IV, 59 (94 per cent) of the 63 companies had
incentive pay immediately after the IPO, with four companies having more than one scheme
running in tandem. Table V shows the overall post IPO summary for all 59 companies with
incentive pay and the fact that four companies have no incentive pay schemes post IPO.
Whilst it is encouraging to see that most companies do have incentive pay schemes
following their flotation, it is the minority (26 companies) that have conditional schemes that
can be seen to help promote the alignment of executive and shareholder interests by the
imposition of performance targets linked to increasing shareholder value. The majority, as
yet, have not chosen to take up the ‘‘best practice’’ recommendation of the Greenbury
Report (1995) and ABI guidelines.
Table III Companies with incentive pay pre IPO and their changes to schemes at IPO
Description Number
Continuation of original unconditional ESOS 5
Termination of original unconditional ESOS and introduction of new unconditional ESOS 7
Termination of original unconditional ESOS and introduction of new conditional ESOS 7
Continuation of original conditional ESOS 1
Termination of original conditional ESOS and introduction of new conditional ESOS 1
Termination of original conditional ESOS – not replaced 1
Total 22
Table IV Companies implementing incentive pay for the first time at IPO
Description Number
Executive share option scheme (unconditional) 21
Executive share option scheme (conditional) 16
Executive share option scheme (conditional) and long term incentive plan (conditional) 1
Total 38
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Performance evaluation
Inspection of incentive pay schemes and their performance criteria shows that conditional
schemes have three interrelated elements, a performance measure, a comparator and a
performance target; and operate over a specified time period, typically three years (Pass
et al., 2000).
Various performance measures are available, including ‘‘earnings per share’’ (EPS)[1],
‘‘total shareholder return’’ (TSR)[2] etc. (see Table VI). Ideally, any performance measure set
by a company will be simple for both executives and investors to understand, provide a
balance between the results for shareholders and factors that are within the control of the
executives and should be correlated to the creation of shareholders value if the scheme is
seen to be an attempt to align the executives motivation with those of the shareholders.
There are two main issues to consider when deciding upon a performance measure, namely
whether it should be accounts based or stock market based. It is generally considered that
EPS is more accounts based, reflecting profitability, whilst TSR is stock market based.
A performance measure in isolation is of little significance and needs to be put into
perspective by comparing it to some other financial yardstick. Again, various comparators
can be utilised, including a comparison with the company’s own previous financial
performance as against some external benchmark, for example, the ‘‘retail price index’’
(RPI) or the performance of a ‘‘peer group’’ of other companies etc. (see Table VII).
Finally, a specified, quantitative performance target level is required in order to judge
whether performance aspirations have actually been achieved, and hence option and LTIP
grants to the executive can then be ‘‘exercised’’ (that is ‘‘cashed in’’).
Selecting an appropriate target level can be controversial. Performance may be judged
against the company’s own self-selected target (for example, a requirement that the
company’s own EPS growth over the next three years must be at least equal to that of the
previous three years growth), or an external comparator/target may be used, for example a
requirement that the company’s EPS growth must exceed the increase in the RPI by at lease
6 per cent over a three-year period (see Table VIII). Either way companies often find
themselves criticised for setting targets, which are too easily achieved (see below). This can
Table VI Performance measures for ESO schemes and the LTIP
Conditional option schemes Number
Earnings per share (EPS) 7
Individual executive basis 4
Profit before interest and taxation (PBIT) 4
Share price 4
Share price and revenue growth 1
Not stated 6
Total 26
LTIP
Earnings per share (EPS) 1
Table V Incentive pay post IPO – the overall position
Description Number
Companies without incentive pay schemes 4
Companies with ESOS (conditional) and LTIP (conditional) 1
Companies with ESOS (conditional) 25
Companies with ESOS (unconditional) 33
Total 63
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be even harder to assess for the IPO company, which may not have years of trading data to
realistically base future targets on.
A typical example of the performance evaluation process is provided by one of the survey
companies:
At the present time the Directors consider growth in earnings per share to be a suitable
measurement of the Company’s performance and so in the foreseeable future an option granted
under the Share Option Scheme will only be exercisable, if over a three year period following the
grant of the option the Company achieves growth in its earnings per share which exceeds the
growth in the Retail Prices Index by an average of two per cent per year (Capcon Holdings Plc
Prospectus, p. 46).
Table VIII Performance measures, comparators and targets for ESO schemes and the LTIP
No. of
companies Measure Comparator Target (all over three years unless otherwise stated)
1 EPS Own EPS To have eps . 0:001p (in year of IPO, EPS was – 8.14p).
1 EPS Not stated Not stated
5 EPS RPI þ0% i.e. just exceed RPI
þ2%
þ5%
þ5%
þ8%
4 Individual executive
basis
Individual executive
basis
Individual executive basis
3 PBIT Own PBIT .£400,000 by 2 years (at IPO company had not made a
profit and in year of IPO made loss of £226,000)
.£700,000 by 1 year after IPO .£2m by 2 years after IPO
(in year of IPO PBIT was £960,000)
.£0 (made loss of £99,000 in year of IPO)
1 PBIT Not stated Not stated
3 Share price Own share price Own share price . 50p. (the issue price for this share was
25p)
Own share price . 100p (the issue price for this share was
50p)
Own share price to increase by 15% pa
1 Share price FTSE peer group and RPI Exceed average growth of FTSE Support Services Sector
(peer group) and RPI þ10%
1 Share price and revenue
growth
Not stated Not stated
6 Not stated Not stated Not stated
26
LTIP
1 EPS RPI þ10% to þ20% straight line sliding scale from 0 to 100%
between the two values
Table VII Performance comparators for ESO schemes and the LTIP
Conditional option schemes Number
Own earnings per share (EPS) 1
Individual executive basis 4
Own PBIT 3
Own share price 3
Retail price index (RPI) 5
FTSE peer group of companies and RPI 1
Not stated 9
Total 26
LTIP
Retail price index 1
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Table VI provides details of the performance ‘‘measures’’ used by the 26 IPO companies
which now operate conditional incentive schemes, comprising those companies with
conditional option schemes and the one company with both a conditional option scheme
and a LTIP (composite details are provided in the Appendix).
The EPS measure predominates, followed by ‘‘share pricerdquo; and ‘‘profit before interest
and taxation’’. In four other cases executives’ performance is measured on an ‘‘individual
basis’’. The most disappointing feature is the lack of disclosure of the performance
measures employed by six of the companies.
Table VII presents details of the ‘‘comparators’’ which have been selected by the 26 IPO
companies. It will be noted that internal comparisons predominate – ‘‘own share price’’,
‘‘own profit before interest and taxation’’, ‘‘own individual executive performance’’ and ‘‘own
EPS’’ in the case of 11 companies. The RPI is the main external comparator. Again a lack of
disclosure and transparency is evident with nine companies failing to reveal their
comparators.
As noted above, the achievement of specific performance ‘‘targets’’ is required in order to
enable executives to exercise their options and LTIP awards. The actual target levels set are
thus crucial in this regard. Target levels may be relatively undemanding or they may be
stretching. For example a requirement that EPS growth must exceed the increase in the RPI
by 4 per cent over three years is more easily achieved than a figure of þ9 per cent. Whilst
this may be difficult for the IPO company to assess, many mature companies have been
criticised by investors for setting an ‘‘easy’’ threshold target for their incentive schemes and
have subsequently set tougher target levels (Pass, 2003). Comparing the degree of difficulty
in achieving performance targets for schemes which have the same performance measures
and comparator but which have different target levels is straightforward. More problematic,
however, are inter-scheme comparisons, having different measures and comparators. For
example, how does one compare the degree of difficulty of two schemes one of which
requires EPS growth to exceed the increase in RPI by 4 per cent over three years with that of
a scheme which requires the company’s share price growth to exceed that of the average
share price growth of a ‘‘peer group’’ of companies?
Table VIII combines together the performance measures and comparators present in
Table VI and VII and adds in the performance ‘‘target’’ requirements which need to be
achieved in order to trigger the exercise of options and LTIP grants for the 26 companies.
The IPO companies operate a variety of schemes and as such it is not possible to make
definitive performance comparisons although some general observations spring to mind
(see concluding section).
Seven companies specified EPS growth targets comparing their EPS growth values against
RPI values, while a further company incorporates this requirement alongside a share price
growth target. Two companies settled for an undemanding EPS/RPIþ0.1 per cent and 2 per
cent, through þ5 per cent in two further cases to a more taxing þ8 per cent in the case of
one company. One company merely required its EPS to become positive after a previous run
of losses.
Four companies specified share price targets. Three of the companies looked to
improvements in their own share price on a stand alone basis, while one company required
its share price to exceed the average share price increase achieved by a peer group of
companies. In the former case the performance target can be seen as ‘‘challenging’’: two
companies required that their share price increase by 100 per cent, and the other by at least
45 per cent over three years.
Three companies specified as performance targets their own profit return (before interest
and taxation), one merely requiring a turn round into profitability after previous losses, with
the other two companies setting quantitative profit growth benchmarks. Four companies
have set targets relating to the performance of individual executives. This is very much a
‘‘subjective’’ exercise.
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Finally we come back (again) to a major omission, nine of the companies surveyed failed to
disclose their performance targets at the time of IPO and inspection of later Annual Reports
reveals this still to be the case (see earlier comments).
Concluding remarks
This paper has focused on the changes in incentive pay schemes of a sample of 63
companies, some of which already operated such schemes, and others which adopted
incentive pay schemes for the first time on the occasion these companies converted to
‘‘public’’ status through an IPO in 2001. The transition from ‘‘private’’ to ‘‘public’’ company
represents a major landmark in a company’s evolution and the infusion of ‘‘outside’’
shareholders brings with it new corporate governance responsibilities. The need to provide
mechanisms which align the interests of the company’s executives with those of its
shareholders has been highlighted by various reports on corporate governance issues (in
particular Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995)) and which has found practical expression
in the ‘‘Combined Code’’ of the London Stock Exchange.
One such mechanism is the executive incentive pay scheme embracing both conditional
option and LTIP configurations with each requiring the achievement of specific performance
‘‘targets’’, and which if achieved, provide mutual benefits for both executives and
shareholders. The presumption underlying this study is that with the dilution of ownership
and control there will be the implementation of incentive pay schemes.
Interestingly, even prior to IPO one third of the companies in the sample had incentive pay
schemes in place, albeit all but three of which were unconditional. This may seem surprising
given the fact that the founding owner was also a key executive director of the company. In
such circumstances the potential principal-agent conflict should not materialise since the
interests of the owner (as ‘‘principal’’) and executive (as ‘‘agent’’) are one and the same.
However, even in these cases the use of incentive pay schemes for other executive directors
could be seen as important as an inducement in attracting high calibre executives to the
Board, as a means of encouraging loyalty and commitment to the company and to reward
their efforts over and above basic salary by giving them a stake in the growing prosperity of
the business.
An important consideration at IPO, however, we would argue, is that companies should be
concerned to have incentive pay schemes in place. The IPO nature of the data does mean
that many of these companies do not have to fully comply with the Combined Code. This is
only applicable to companies listing on the main market (the official list). Many of the new
listings reflect the growing trend to float on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and thus
do not have the need to comply with the Combined Code. However, they are still subject to
agency theory and it is our opinion that the guidelines for AIM flotation do not emphasis
strongly enough the importance of ‘‘best practice’’ for public companies and the influence
that incentive pay schemes can have as a governance tool. This may explain the more
relaxed nature of implementing unconditional rather than conditional schemes.
Not withstanding this, companies with performance targets are able to send a much
stronger ‘‘strategic signal’’ to prospective investors (i.e. shareholders) that they will be
particularly mindful of their responsibilities to protect and enhance the interests of
shareholders and thus provide better future returns for shareholders than those companies
without such schemes. With the flotation marketplace, it may be much more important to
gain the ‘‘right’’ investors at this uncertain time and period of potential growth.
As noted earlier, the 63 companies included in this survey for 2001 are part of a broader
based study of IPO companies over an extended time period. Until this data set is complete
and more information is forthcoming, for example, on performance outcomes it is not
possible to undertake definitive testing of the impact of conditional incentive pay schemes.
Some preliminary observations based on the 2001 sample, however can be made. A
substantial number of companies chose to change to or implement for the first time, a
conditional executive incentive pay scheme, thus conforming to recommended ‘‘best’’
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corporate governance practice. To summarise, 22 companies operated incentive pay
schemes prior to IPO of which only 3 had conditional schemes specifying performance
targets. The remainder operated unconditional schemes. More notably, 41 companies had
no incentive pay arrangements. Post IPO the situation had changed significantly with a total
of 59 out of a total of 63 now operating incentive pay schemes, with 26 companies operating
conditional schemes and 33 operating unconditional schemes.
Although the jump from three to 26 companies operating conditional incentive pay schemes
may appear to be impressive, there is still a long way to go to conform to ‘‘best practice’’.
Post IPO a majority of companies operated an unconditional scheme rather than a
conditional one imposing specific performance targets.
Even in the case of those companies which adopted a conditional option scheme, there
remain a number of question marks. First, many of the performance ‘‘targets’’ appear to be
undemanding and will need to be made ‘‘tougher’’ in order to satisfy investor bodies such as
the National Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British Insurers, which look
to, for example, an EPS/RPI þ9 per cent over three years as a minimum yardstick.
Second, the ‘‘preference’’ of 11 companies to use there ‘‘own’’ rather than external
comparators is, in the eyes of some critics, too introverted and myopic. A more objective
‘‘test’’ of performance is to compare your performance against some other external
comparator rather than one’s own previous performance, since the former gives some
indication of relative performance. Ideally it is argued, the comparator should be a ‘‘peer’’
group of other companies in the same line of business activity. This would enable investors to
judge whether the company’s performance was mediocre or truly excellent. Only one
company in the survey used the ‘‘peer’’ group comparator at IPO. Some others used the RPI
as their comparator but, it could be argued, testing one’s performance against an all
embracing inflation yardstick is not as demanding as doing well in comparison to competitor
companies.
Third, in a substantial number of cases a big problem is the lack of transparency and
disclosure. At IPO in 2001, nine of the 26 companies using conditional schemes had failed to
fully reveal their performance criteria and this has remained the case (as at end of 2003).
Clearly this is an unsatisfactory situation and undoubtedly shareholders will bring pressure
to bear on this matter, particularly if this continues following the new disclosure amendments
required by the 2002 Regulation. Similarly, an element of shareholder dissent may be
directed at those schemes that are ‘‘unconditional’’ or where selected performance targets
appear to be undemanding.
Notes
1. EPS is defined as total profit after tax divided by the number of ordinary shares.
2. TSR is defined as the return on an investor’s shareholding reflected in the company’s share price,
assuming all dividends are reinvested.
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Appendix
Table AI Companies with conditional ESO schemes post IPO
IPODATE Company Industry
Option
performance
measure
Option
performance
comparatora
Option performance target (over
three years unless otherwise
stated)
31-May-01 Capcon Holdings Speciality and
other finance
EPS RPI Growth of RPIþ 2% per year
4-Jul-01 Corac Group Engineering and
machinery
EPS Not stated Not stated
9-Apr-01 Marlborough Stirling
PLC
Software and
computer
services
EPS RPI RPI þ5% pa compounded
exercisable in two equal tranches
after 2 years and 3 years, lapse
after 6 years
30-Nov-01 Murgitroyd Group Support services EPS RPI Growth to exceed RPIþ 0% per
year
30-Nov-01 Symphony Plastic
Technologies PLC
Chemicals EPS Own EPS Greater than 0.001p per share
exercisable after 2 years lapse
after 10 years
23-Feb-01 Tribal Group Support services EPS RPI RPIþ 8% over 2 year period from
grant
4-Jun-01 Atlantic Global Software and
computer
services
EPS RPI EPS increase by RPI þ5% from
2000 to 2003
23-Aug-01 MOS International
PLC
Oil and gas Individual
executive basis
Individual
executive basis
Individual executive basis
21-Feb-01 Oystertec Engineering and
machinery
Individual
executive basis
Individual
executive basis
Individual executive basis
exercisable after 2 years lapse
after 10 years
15-Aug-01 Sport Entertainment
and Media Group PLC
(The)
Media and
photography
Individual
executive basis
Individual
executive basis
Individual executive basis
10-Dec-01 TripleArc PLC Media and
photography
Individual
executive basis
Individual
executive basis
Individual executive basis:
exercisable on two triggers related
to specific sales and/or profit
targets
26-Feb-01 Blavod Black Vodka Beverages Not stated Not stated Not stated
28-Jun-01 GW Pharmaceuticals
PLC
Pharmaceuticals Not stated Not stated Not stated
11-Sep-01 Henderson Morley
PLC
Pharmaceuticals Not stated Not stated Not stated
25-Oct-01 Home Entertainment
Corporation PLC
General retailers Not stated Not stated Not stated
26-Mar-01 Real Affinity Media and
photography
Not stated Not stated Not stated
20-Aug-01 SRS Technology
Group
Household goods
and textiles
Not stated Not stated Not stated
23-May-01 Imprint Search &
Selection
Support services PBIT Not stated Not stated
14-May-01 Maverick
Entertainment Group
Media and
photography
PBIT Own PBIT PBIT in yr ending 21-Dec-03 is
equal or greater than £400,000
17-May-01 Proactive Sports
Group
Media and
photography
PBIT Own PBIT PBIT in yr ending 31Aug-01
.£700,000 and yr ending 2002
.£2m
14-Feb-01 Staffing Ventures Support services PBIT Own PBIT Previous 6 months figs are positive
options exercisable from any time
performance criteria met and lapse
after 10 years
(Continued)
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Table AI
IPODATE Company Industry
Option
performance
measure
Option
performance
comparatora
Option performance target (over
three years unless otherwise
stated)
5-Jul-01 LiDCO Group PLC Health Share price Own share price Share price to have 15% growth pa
over three years¼ 33% vest, full
vesting 22.5% growth
14-Aug-01 Meriden Group PLC Support services Share price Own share price Share price to be greater
or ¼ 50p
22-Mar-01 Patientline Telecom. services Share price FTSE peer group
of companies and
RPI
Exceed average growth of FTSE
support services sector and RPI
þ10%
23-May-01 Pursuit Dynamics Engineering and
machinery
Share price Own share price Share price greater than 100p for
period of 30 consecutive days
options exercisable in three equal
tranches after 1, 2 and 3 years
8-Jan-01 Intercede Group Software and
computer
services
Share price and
rev growth
Not stated Not stated
LTIP
Company
23-Feb-01 Tribal Group Support services EPS RPI þ10% to RPI
þ20% on straight
line basis
RPI
Note: asome companies have indicated that schemes will be amended to reflect the Consumer Price Index (adopted December 2003)
rather than RPI for grants following this date
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